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Corruption, which remains a serious problem in many countries, has prompted consider-
able research in recent years. This paper adds to the extant literature with insights on fac-
tors influencing corrupt activity. Using cross-country data for about 100 nations, the roles 
of national history, geography, and government are examined to see how they affect condi-
tions for corruption, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The innovative aspects of this 
research include use of a wide set of historical, geographical, and governmental determi-
nants of corruption, as well as detailed assessment of several previously considered deter-
minants. The main issues addressed are the effects of the size and scope of government on 
the incidence of corruption across countries, and the significance of historical and geo-
graphic factors in corruption. Regarding the first question, the authors find the size and 
scope of government can significantly affect corruption. On the second, it is shown that 
historical institutional inertia in older countries and new rent-seeking opportunities in 
younger nations can encourage corruption, while certain geographic factors can mitigate 
corruption. The paper ends with discussion aimed at the policymaker. 
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Korruptio on edelleen vakava ongelma monissa maissa, ja siksi siihen liittyvä tutkimus on 
lisääntynyt viime vuosina. Tässä tutkimuksessa selvitetään korruptioon vaikuttavia tekijöi-
tä. Noin 100 maata käsittävän aineiston avulla voidaan tarkastella maiden historian, maan-
tieteen ja julkisen sektorin vaikutusta korruptioon sekä kvantitatiivisesti että kvalitatiivises-
ti. Tutkimus eroaa aiemmista nimenomaan siten, että aiemmin käytettyihin tekijöihin lisä-
tään hyvin monia historiaan, maantieteeseen ja julkiseen sektoriin liittyviä muuttujia seli-
tettäessä korruptiota. Tulosten mukaan julkisen sektorin koko ja tehtävien laajuus vaikutta-
vat korruptioon. Lisäksi historiallisten tekijöiden paino voi lisätä korruptiota vanhemmissa 
valtioissa, kun taas uusissa valtioissa saattaa syntyä enemmän tilaisuuksia korruptiolle. 
Jotkin maantieteelliset tekijät näyttävät vähentävän korruptiota. Loppupäätelmissä pohdi-
taan keinoja, joilla korruptiota voisi vähentää. 
 
Asiasanat: korruptio, lahjonta, julkisen sektorin koko, julkisen sektorin tehtävät, rent see-
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1  Introduction 
 
Corruption continues to be a serious problem for many countries. The World Bank esti-
mates that globally about $1 trillion in bribes are paid out each year – a fairly substantial 
figure, given that e.g. the total size of the world economy in 2001-2002 was $30 trillion. In 
recent years, international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank and 
the OECD have made corruption control a significant focus of their agendas. The United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption, adopted in December 2003, today includes 140 
signatories to increased cooperation in fighting corruption.
1,  2 The effectiveness of such 
initiatives in curbing corruption, however, remains unclear. 
There has been considerable empirical research in recent years on the causes and 
effects of corruption across countries. Ades and Di Tella (1997), Bardhan (1997), Jain 
(2001) and Lambsdorff (2006b) provide extensive literature reviews, and Serra (2006) and 
Tanzi (1998) give useful analyses. Yet the connections between variables are often am-
biguous (e.g. the effect of government size on corruption and the influence of democracy 
on corruption) and data on corrupt activity are notoriously inadequate. There are two rea-
sons for this. First, it is practically impossible to measure the extent of corrupt activity 
when it is shrouded in secrecy. Second, it is difficult to quantify the institutional and cul-
tural factors that bear on corruption. 
This paper adds to the extant literature by using cross-country data for about 100 
nations to examine the role of historical factors, geographic influences, and government on 
corruption. As evidenced by the corruption literature review of Jain (2001), our focus on 
historical and geographic factors is apparently novel.  Moreover, we consider the role of 
government intervention in the economy, both in terms of size and scope, in greater detail 
than in the existing literature. Important innovations of this research include consideration 
of a wide set of historical, geographical, and government determinants of corruption, as 
well as examination of several previously considered determinants in more detail. Our re-
sults also carry implications for public policy, which can potentially be altered to reduce 
the incidence of corrupt activity. 
 
1 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/newsletter_2003-12-01_1_page003.html  
2  Corruption is generally defined as the use or abuse of public office for private gain. From an economic 
perspective, undesirable consequences of corruption involve increases in the costs of legal dealings and dis-
tributional concerns associated with favoring haves over have-nots. Conversely, corrupt acts might lead in 
some instances to efficiency gains for the haves. Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson 
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Country-specific factors such as the geographic expanse of a country affect both incentives 
for engaging in corrupt activities and the governance of such acts. Spread-out countries 
seem to be more susceptible to corrupt activities for two reasons. First, it is relatively 
harder to monitor government officials in geographically disperse locations.
3  Consider, for 
example, the relative challenges of monitoring two potentially corruptible civil servants 
working for a customs department. One employee is stationed at a remote border crossing, 
while the other works in the customs central office in the country’s capital. Other things 
being the same, the border official is more likely to take advantage of her discretionary 
control than her counterpart in the central office. The second, and less obvious, reason is 
that a “prisoner’s dilemma” situation is less likely to arise when the employee is isolated. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggest the potential threat of colleagues telling on them can 
act as a deterrent for clustered corruptible employees. To account for the possible role of 
these factors, we include five measures of a country’s geography: physical land area, de-
gree of urbanization, extent of digital networking, natural resource endowments, and the 
average land area size of first-order administrative (subnational) governments. We then ask 
if expansive countries or countries with less geographically concentrated populations, ce-
teris paribus, are inherently more corrupt. 
History shapes the cultural norms that dictate corrupt acts. Bribe-giving and bribe-
taking may be socially acceptable in one country, while frowned upon elsewhere. Bribe-
givers and bribe-takers also develop “efficient” mechanisms over time for engaging in cor-
rupt practices. We use the number of years of national independence to identify the effect 
of historical influence.
4 Specifically, we distinguish between newly independent or transi-
tion countries and nations that have been independent for substantial periods of time.
5 
Lambsdorff (2006b) notes that the role of government can come into play in ways 
that can make corruption “hard to find” (see also Rose-Ackerman, 1999). For example, a 
large government might contribute to corruption by increasing red tape (Goel and Nelson, 
1998) or promulgating regulations that induce individuals to seek illegal means to circum-
vent those rules (Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003). Large governments, of course, may also have 
 
3 Progress in monitoring technologies (e.g. video surveillance, electronic real time transaction records) has 
made monitoring somewhat easier. We try to account for this aspect by including the extent of a nation’s 
digital networking. 
4  We mostly use independence dates given in the CIA World Factbook. In those few instances where the 
nation has been under foreign occupation for a time (e.g. Germany), the year of independence is problematic. 
5 Some studies use years of democracy as an explanatory variable (Treisman, 2000). It seems that historical 
influence on corruption may be better captured by the years of independence. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




the depth of resources to monitor for corrupt government activities via extensive policing 
and enforcement of good governance standards (La Porta et al., 1999; May et al., 2002). 
Further, the structure of the government machinery in terms of degree of decentralization 
may affect corrupt activity. Thus, we model decentralization using several measures and 
provide a comprehensive look at a broad sample of developing and developed countries via 
various avenues through which governments can affect the levels and nature of corruption. 
 
Two key questions are addressed in this study:  
1.  What are the effects of the size and scope of the public sector on the incidence of 
corruption across countries?  
2.  How important are historical and geographic influences in affecting institutions that 
have a large bearing on corruption?  
 
In addressing these questions, we control for factors identified in the literature as 
corruption determinants such as the stage of national development, strength of democratic 
institutions, and type of legal system.  
  It is our hope that these findings not only further the literature in this area but 
also are helpful to policymakers in national and cross-national contexts. It is conceivable, 
for example that one might find it useful to know whether blanket corruption reduction 
policies work effectively across nations, or whether anti-corruption policies need to be in-
dividually tailored to meet the unique circumstances of each nation.  
 
 
2  Data and the model 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of our model draw upon the seminal work of Becker (1968), 
in which individuals weigh the relative costs and benefits of illegal (corrupt) acts to make a 
“rational” choice. These cost and benefits are influenced by exogenous factors that include 
the role of the government and the socio-cultural environment. The socio-cultural envi-
ronment in a country, in turn, has been shaped by its historical and country-specific in-Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson 
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fluences. We take all these considerations into account to conduct the empirical investiga-
tion. 
In determining the causes of corruption, a dependent variable, denoting the percep-
tions about corruption, is the corruption index from the Transparency International (TI). 
The TI index has been widely used in studies of corruption for about a decade.
6, 
7 
  The formal estimated equation takes the following form: 
  Corruptit = f(Prosperityit, Democracyit, Legal Systemi, Governmental  
 Characteristicsit, Historyi, Geographyi)     (1) 
     i = 1,….., n;  t = 1995-97, 1998-2000, 2001-2003. 
Subscript i denotes a country and t denotes time. Our pooled sample data set includes about 
100 countries and three time periods: 1995-1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003. Details about 
the definitions of all the variables used in the analysis, the sources of data, and summary 
statistics are provided in Table 1. The countries included in the data set are listed in the 
Appendix.
8 
All equations based on (1) were estimated using LIMDEP and random effects mod-
els. These models have been widely used in data sets such as ours, i.e. cross-sectionally 
dominated with time-invariant variables included among the regressors (Beck and Katz, 
1995, footnote 4).9 Further, the Lagrange multiplier test signified the superiority of these 
models over models ignoring country-specific effects in all cases (see Tables 2 and 3).10 
Our analysis begins with a “baseline” model consisting of three control variables 
that have been frequently incorporated into earlier empirical models on the determinants of 
corruption activity (Serra, 2006). In particular, a country’s level of economic prosperity 
(Per Capita GDP) is included in almost every study of the causes of corruption. Greater 
prosperity lowers the discount rates of both bribes-takers and bribe-givers, making them 
less eager to jump queues via illegal means. Furthermore, the opportunity costs associated 
 
6  For details, see www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2004_faq.html. 
7  The World Bank uses a corruption index similar to the TI index. We ran several models with the World 
Bank index data to check the robustness of our findings. The results with the World Bank corruption measure 
were largely similar to those with the TI measures, so they are not reported here. 
8  Consistent data were not available for all countries in all three time periods. For most of the models esti-
mated below, there were 53 countries in the data set for the earliest period in our data set, 87 countries for the 
middle period, and 105 countries in the most recent period. 
9  Greene (2002, p. E8-16) also advises estimating a random effects model in such situations. 
10  The results are quite similar to those obtained via OLS based on robust standard errors. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




with punishment are greater for wealthier individuals and this might also act as a deter-
rent.
11 More prosperous nations are also able to spend more to educate their populations. A 
relatively well educated population not only likely to be more aware of its rights and duties 
and less likely to engage in corrupt practices, it is probably in a better position to amenable 
and understanding of anti-corruption policies and procedures. 
Second, the extent of democratic institutions and attitudes in a nation affects cor-
ruption in complex ways. Democratic nations (Democracy) likely face lower degrees of 
corruption since corrupt officials, whether elected or appointed, face a threat of losing pub-
lic office (i.e. their rent-seeking potential). In contrast, corruption offers unique rent-
seeking opportunities in less democratic countries. As the disbursements of government 
contracts in a non-democratic environment are handled by a few appointed officials, the 
bureaucrats are in a position to allocate contracts out of turn (i.e. there are greater opportu-
nities for rent-generating).
12 Further, special interest groups, including bribe-takers, bribe-
givers, and anti-corruption forces, may be in better positions to organize in democratic so-
cieties and thus be able to push or defend their interests (Mitchell and Munger, 1991). 
Finally, there is a strand of argument that the judicial framework of a country can 
affect the level of corruption (La Porta et al., 2004; and Treisman, 2000). That is, a consis-
tent, well-defined legal system that clarifies potential costs of illegal acts may act as a de-
terrent to corruption-prone individuals. Borrowing from this earlier literature, countries 
with judiciaries following the English common law (Common Law System) is included as a 
control variable in almost all the models presented.
 13 We also identify countries using so-




We now turn to the potential determinants of corruption of primary interest. 
 
Government: From one perspective, larger governments (Size of Government) may con-
tribute to corruption through increased bureaucracy and red tape and via greater opportuni-
                                                 
11  The relative distribution of income in a country might also influence the level of corrupt activity. We do 
not consider this aspect here. 
12  Kunicová (2006) fleshes out these theoretical arguments nicely. 
13  While governments can vary the degree of intervention in the economy relatively easily, systems of gov-
ernment and bodies of law tend to change infrequently. Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson 
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ties to engage in corrupt activities (see Goel and Nelson, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; and 
Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Some theoretical arguments surrounding the rent-generation by 
monopolist government officials are nicely developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Al-
ternatively, a relatively large government might reflect greater spending on law enforce-
ment machinery (and greater checks and balances) that may decrease corruption. 
Governments can impose significant rules and restrictions that create opportunities 
for rent-seeking by bureaucrats. To shed light on this, we add two measures of the degree 
of government intervention (scope of government) in the economy: 
•  Government Intervention (1): An index based on the overall size and growth of the 
public sector (including state-owned enterprises), top marginal individual and cor-
porate tax rates, monetary policy (inflation trends), and the degree of regulation on 
foreign investment, banking and finance, and wage and price controls. 
•  Government Intervention (2): A narrower index of government intervention based 
only on monetary policy and the degree of government regulation used in the other 
measure of government intervention. 
Since these measures come from the same source, they are fairly consistent across coun-
tries.
14 The basis for inclusion of these regulatory variables in the empirical setup is an as-
sumption that a constrained economy creates opportunities for engaging in corrupt prac-
tices. 
Finally, the decentralization of government functions could affect corruption in im-
portant ways. Greater decentralization may enable better monitoring and lower corrupt ac-
tivities (local government officials are closer to voters), which would mitigate the princi-
pal-agent problem. On the other hand, greater decentralization could imply more red tape 
and thereby increase opportunities for generating rents. Brueckner (2000), for example, 
argues that corrupt activity is inherently more likely among subnational governments. 
Little empirical work has been done on the link between government structure and 
the incidence of corruption.
15 We employ two measures of decentralization.
16 These meas-
 
14  Both government intervention measures are constructed from simple averages of selected components of 
the  Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation (posted at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/Chapter_5.pdf). Certain index components (trade 
policy restrictions, rule of law and property rights, regulations in the areas of health, safety, environment, and 
the extent of the informal market) are excluded from both measures as they are based, at least in part, on the 
level of perceived corruption in the country.  
15 Fisman and Gatti (2002) examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization (subnational government 
share of total government spending), finding that greater decentralization is associated with a lower incidence BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




ures, not previously considered in the literature, are each based on the number of first-order 
administrative divisions within a country as reported in the CIA’s World Factbook (ac-
cessed in July 2006). The total of such administrative units in each country is alternately 




History: The relation between history and corruption appears complex and yet to be fully 
studied in the literature (see Lambsdorff, 2006b, p. 22). Nevertheless, we can posit that his-
torical precedents and customs shape a nation’s institutions and contractual norms.
18 Thus, 
entrenched practices in “old” countries might be difficult to abandon. Outsiders may also 
view them as corrupt. Corruption in such nations might have become a part of the culture 
of doing business and thus might be socially acceptable. Over time, potential bribe-givers 
also become familiar with the mechanisms and rituals of offering bribes, e.g. whether to go 
through intermediaries or approach the corrupt official directly (see Lambsdorff, 2002; and 
Lambsdorff and Teksoz, 2004). It is possible, of course, that enforcement mechanisms and 
oversight processes might also be streamlined in old countries, making corruption less 
likely. We classify old nations as countries with long histories of independence (Old Coun-
try).
19 
An absence of a long history in newly independent nations (New Country) might 
present different incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Relatively new countries 
could face greater corruption due to underdeveloped monitoring and governance mecha-
                                                                                                                                                    
of corruption. We use a somewhat broader measure of decentralization than fiscal decentralization and one 
that has been widely used in empirical studies of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1999). Further, data on subnational 
government spending is primarily available for selected developed countries. In contrast, our decentralization 
measures can be constructed for virtually any country (see Table 1).  
16  Another measure (Federal System) pertains to whether the structure of the government is federal or uni-
tary. Here, federalist structure is defined, in contrast to unitary states, as a system whereby subnational gov-
ernments have autonomy in at least one area of action (Treisman, 2000). The results are not reported as the 
corresponding coefficient was statistically insignificant in all variations estimated. Fisman and Gatti (2002) 
also find the corresponding coefficient to be statistically insignificant. 
17  Examples of such administrative units include the number of states in some cases, counties, and boroughs. 
The variables in this case are converted to natural logs to smooth wide variations across countries. 
18  See Knack and Keefer (1995) for the frame-breaking work on the importance of institutional factors (see 
also Lambsdorff, 2006b; and Paldam, 2002).  
19 Some researchers focus on a nation’s colonial heritage to capture the effect of persistence of institutions 
(see e.g. Treisman, 2000). Accordingly, we included a dummy variable identifying former British colonies. 
The resulting variable was statistically insignificant, so the corresponding results are not reported. Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson 
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20 Also, greater degrees of privatization in such nations in the initial phases might 
also create unique opportunities for bribe-giving and bribe solicitation (see Kaufmann and 
Siegelbaum, 1996). Conversely, greater public idealism in newly independent countries 
could act as a self-check against corruption.
21  
The countries in the middle – those neither new nor old – are likely to be unaffected 
strongly by the historical influences discussed above. They have not been independent long 
enough for corrupt practices to be widely entrenched, yet they have passed the period of 
disproportionate rent-generating opportunities associated with initial privatization. Thus, 
one may view the incidence of corruption in relation to the years of a nation’s independ-
ence as a U-shaped curve where there are greater corrupt practices in initial years of inde-
pendence and then these practices somewhat decline, while going up again as corrupt prac-
tices become deep-rooted in old nations. Model 3.1 in Table 3 sheds empirical light on this 
rationale. 
 
Geography: Geography of a country can also affect the prevalence of corruption. Large, 
sprawling countries might be exposed to greater corruption due to their inability to effec-
tively monitor public officials (potential bribe-takers), especially those in remote areas. On 
the other hand, good information exchange in a nation can enhance monitoring and act as a 
check against corruption. It has also been argued that a country’s natural resource endow-
ments create unique opportunities for rent-generation and rent-seeking (see Lambsdorff, 
2006b; and Treisman, 2003). Further, there might be a greater chance of corrupt practices 
being caught (or exposed by whistle blowers) in areas with dense population concentra-
tions. In addition to (Subnational Govt’s/area), four measures of geography are used: 
                                                 
20  Paldam (2002) incorporates the effect of culture more formally by including dummy variables for different 
culturally-alike nations in the world. However, he concludes that culture may offer an “inferior” explanation 
of corrupt activity (p. 238). 
21  In determining the year of independence we relied on the dates published in the most recent CIA World 
Factbook. “For most countries, this [is] … the date that sovereignty was achieved … For the other countries, 
the date …may not represent ‘independence’ in the strict sense, but rather some significant nationhood event 
such as the traditional founding date or the date of unification, federation, confederation, establishment, fun-
damental change in the form of government, or state succession.” The former Soviet states, for example, are 
all assumed to have gained their independence in 1991. For further details, see 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html. 
   While our cutoff between old and new countries might seem arbitrary (see Table 1), there seems to be no 
“best” method for classifying nations, especially given the huge variation (and discontinuity) in the years of 
independence. An alternate way to view our classification is to envision old countries as ones that obtained 
independence over a century ago and new countries being those that attained independence (roughly) less 
than 50 years ago. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
physical land area (Land Area), degree of urbanization (Urban), natural resource endow-
ments (Nat Res), and Internet users as a share of the population (Internet). 
The comparison of the historical and geographic influences in how they affect corrup-
tion is unique to the literature. Both considerations are largely out of the control of any na-
tion’s current government. Thus, if these influences have significant impacts on corruption, 
governments must find alternative policy measures to counter their effects. 
 
 
3  Results 
 
Before turning to detailed results of our econometric investigation in Tables 2 and 3, we 
present the baseline model with economic prosperity, democracy, and legal system as de-
terminants of corruption. These control variables have been used in a number of studies 
(see Jain, 2001; Lambsdorff, 2006b; and Serra, 2006). The estimate of the baseline model 
yields the following: 
 
Corruptit =   -3.94* - 0.131*[Per Capita GDP] it - 0.118*[Democracy] it  
                     (13.9)    (13.4)                                   (3.7) 
 
-  0.672*[Common Law System] t,    
      (2.7) 
where the absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses, N = 245, and a random effects 
error structure is assumed.
22  
All the variables in the baseline model have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. In particular, greater economic prosperity (Per Capita 
GDP) results in a reduction in the incidence of corruption, a finding consistent with nearly 
all of the existing literature on the determinants of corruption. More democratic countries 
(Democracy) also experience lower levels of corruption. The significance of political free-
dom in terms of its possible impact on corruption has been recognized by the World Bank. 
However, the evidence regarding the effect of democracy on corruption has been mixed in 
the literature. Some studies have produced similar results (Goel and Nelson, 2005), while 
 
22 OLS results (available on request) of the base model without group effects are quite similar. However, the 
results of a Lagrange Multiplier test (=167.1, 1 df) indicated the superiority of a random effects model over a 
model that ignores country-specific effects. Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson 
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others have failed to find a statistical significant influence (Ades and Di Tella, 1997; Fis-
man and Gatti, 2002; and Paldam, 2002). 
Countries using the English Common Law System, other things being equal, tend to 
have lower corruption. This might be due to a streamlined legal system and a consistent set 
of checks and balances. Potential bribe-takers and bribe-givers are relatively certain of the 
costs of corrupt acts when the legal framework is well-defined and consistent. Such regula-
tions are not only beneficial for internal transactions, but also play a crucial role in interna-
tional trade. The results regarding the influence of Common Law System are consistent 
with the literature (Treisman, 2000). 
The above findings that greater economic prosperity in a nation leads to lower cor-
ruption, as does greater democracy and adherence to English common law, hold for all the 
expanded models summarized in Tables 2 and 3 below. We now turn to these expanded 
models and address our principal questions of interest. 
 
What are the effects of the size and scope of government on the incidence of corruption 
across countries? 
  
The answers to the first question are based on the results reported in Table 2. Recall that 
the dependent variable, corruption index (the TI corruption measure), is scaled so that 
higher values imply greater perceived corruption. The results indicate that greater govern-
ment intervention in a country’s economy leads to more corruption (see Models 2.1, 2.2 
and 2.4). This conclusion holds across the two measures of intervention (Government In-
tervention (1) and Government Intervention (2)). Also recall that higher values of both in-
tervention measures imply less intervention in the economy. The result suggests that while 
greater government intrusions in the economy might be justified to fix certain imperfec-
tions, they have the undesirable side-effect of increasing corruption. Thus, a social cost-
benefit calculation of government intervention should also include the costs of corruption. 
Interestingly, our results also show that when a traditional measure of government 
intervention (Size of Government) is included in the estimating equation, larger govern-
ment size in fact leads to lower corruption. This result supports cross-country findings in 
the literature (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Goel and Nelson, 2005). The conclusion holds irre-
spective of whether the size variable appears separately in the model (Model 2.3) or is in-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
cluded with the Government Intervention (2) variable (Model 2.4).
23 These results suggest 
that it is not a large public sector in itself that contributes to corrupt activity; larger gov-
ernments may well be involved in greater spending on law enforcement and implementing 
checks and balances to deter such activity. Rather, greater regulatory activity in the public 
arena seems to foster corruption by increasing opportunities to engage in corrupt behav-
ior.
24 
The effect of government decentralization on corruption is mixed. Countries with 
greater first-order administrative units per capita (Subnational Govt’s/pop) are associated 
with lower corruption activity (Model 2.5). This finding is consistent with the argument 
that greater fragmentation of local government structure enables the citizenry to better 
monitor and curtail corrupt activities. Finally, normalizing administrative units by land 
area (Subnational Govt’s/area), rather than population, does not reveal a statistically sig-
nificant effect on corruption perceptions (Model 2.6). 
Countries with socialist systems, as well as French and German commercial sys-
tems appeared to have higher corruption (Model 2.7). Consistent with the widely held per-
ception, Scandinavian nations were among the least corrupt, albeit the pertinent coefficient 
is statistically insignificant. 
Overall, the answer to the first question is that government does matter in important 
ways in its impact on corruption. A large public sector – measured by government con-
sumption share of GDP (Size of Government) – in and of itself does not contribute to the 
perceived level of corruption in a country. If fact, our findings indicate precisely the oppo-
site: a larger public sector presence is associated with less corruption, other things equal, 
perhaps reflecting greater public vigilance against such behavior or stronger institutions 
that serve to combat such activity. Nevertheless, it is also clear that certain forms of gov-
ernment intervention in the economy, particularly regulatory intervention, promotes cor-
ruption by creating greater opportunities for bribe-taking and bribe-giving behavior (see 
Government Intervention (1) and (2) in Table 2). Further, capturing the scope of govern-
ment activity via the number of administrative units in a country lowers corruption when 
the relevant variable is normalized by population (Model 2.5), but not when normalized by 
 
23 A model was not estimated with the Government Size and the Government Intervention (1) variables since 
the latter includes government size of as a component of that index. See Table 1. 
24 It is well known that the impacts of government regulations on the economy are not always adequately 
measured by the government expenditures, the standard measure of the government size (Rosen, 1995, p. 15).  Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson 
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land area (Model 2.6). This difference makes sense when one thinks about the fact that 
greater population (and not larger land area itself) increases potential bribe-giver discount 
rates by increasing competition for favors. 
 
How important are historical and geographic influences in affecting institutions that have 
a key bearing on corruption?  
 
Table 3 summarizes regression results that focus on historical and geographic influences 
for the TI corruption measure. The signs of the control variables used in Table 2 also hold 
in Table 3. Specifically, more prosperous and democratic countries are likely to have lower 
corruption. Further, countries that adhere to Common Law System have lower corruption. 
Turning to historical influences, both Old Country and New Country have adverse 
effects on corruption (Model 3.1). Newly independent countries may have greater corrup-
tion due to relatively underdeveloped or undeveloped institutions and procurement prac-
tices. Further, relatively large scale privatization drives in some of these nations might cre-
ate unique opportunities for rent-seeking. In contrast, older countries tend to have well-
developed institutions. While some of these institutions might be effective at fighting cor-
ruption, others may work well at guarding or even promoting corruption. Our results indi-
cate that latter influences are more powerful.
25 In any case, the historical influences signify 
the constraints current governments face in combating corruption as the historical influ-
ences can only be countered over time, if at all. Comparing the relative magnitudes of Old 
Country and New Country, our results show that both types of nations have similar tenden-
cies to induce corruption, although the magnitude of the coefficient on Old Country is 
somewhat larger. 
With regard to geographic factors, our findings indicate that countries with more 
geographically concentrated populations (Urban) are likely to have lower corruption. Cor-
rupt practices may be easier to detect in urban populations and thereby deter corruption 
(Models 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3). The stigma of corruption itself may also be stronger in urban 
areas.
26  Other geographic factors that might affect corruption are the physical geographic 
 
25  Our data do not allow us to qualitatively distinguish between the types of corruption. It might be the case 
that qualitatively different types of corruption (for example, grand versus petty corruption) might exist be-
tween an Old Country and a New Country. 
26  This finding should be viewed with some caution, however, as this result might partly signify measure-
ment error as corrupt practices in rural areas may be harder to detect and/or record. We thank Johann 
Lambsdorff for noting this. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
expanse of a country (Land Area) and the number of local governments (first-order admin-
istrative units) normalized by land area (Subnational Govt’s/area). The results summarized 
in Table 3 reveal that neither Land Area nor Subnational Govt’s/area are statistically sig-
nificant determinants of corruption.
27 The results for the government decentralization vari-
able confirm the earlier results presented in Table 2 (Model 2.6). Finally, a country’s natu-
ral resource endowments (Nat Res in Model 4.4) and the number of Internet users (Internet 
in Model 4.3) do not seem to significantly impact the level of corruption. 
Among the various measures of geographic influence, it seems that a country’s 
population distribution geographically, rather than its physical expanse, is more significant 
in terms of the impact on corruption.
28 
In summary, comparing the historical and geographic influences, it is evident that 
these influences work at cross purposes in their impact on corruption. Only a greater de-
gree of urbanization results in a lower corruption. However, since most historical and geo-
graphical influences are largely exogenous, the findings regarding the size and the scope of 
the public sector provide the most important insights into how government policies might 
be changed to control corruption. 
To compare the relative effects of government, history and geography and to bring 
the title of this paper into sharper focus, a final set of regression results is presented as 
Model 5.1 in Table 4. In addition to the “baseline” regressors, the right-hand variables in-
clude most of the Government, History, and Geography variables that are statistically sig-
nificant in Tables 2 and 3.
29 The results confirm the earlier analysis that each of these vari-
ables impact corruption in a manner predicted by the earlier analysis. 
To gain additional insights into these results, the right-hand column of Table 4 pre-
sents estimates of the impact on corruption when a regressor moves from the lowest value 
in the data set to the highest value. The impact of economic prosperity is potentially the 
greatest in terms of corruption reduction, while the impacts of greater democracy and ad-
herence to a consistent legal system are similar. Among the government measures, the im-
pact of decentralization is the greatest compared to government intervention and the size of 
 
27  We also experimented with a variable that identified island nations to see whether island countries were 
somehow different in terms of the incidence of corruption. The coefficient on the resulting variable was sta-
tistically insignificant. 
28  As a practical matter, the degree of urbanization of a country is more likely to change over time than its 
physical size.  
29 Recall that Government Intervention (1), while statistically significant in earlier analysis, cannot be used in 
a regression set up that includes Government Size since the two variables are somewhat closely related.  Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson 
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the government. Further, the corruption-enhancing effect of government intervention has 
the potential to cancel out any reduction in corruption generated by a large government 
machinery (size). These two historical factors have similar perverse influences on corrup-
tion, while the degree of urbanization appears to have a significant impact on corruption 
reduction.
30 
In closing, we briefly note the results of some additional testing to check the ro-
bustness of our results. First, there is a valid criticism that comparing the TI corruption in-
dex over time is problematic because the survey sample, methodology, and data sources 
have not remained constant from year to year.
31 One way to address this concern has been 
suggested by Björnskov and Paldam (2004) – use country rankings that can be derived 
from the index rather than the index itself. Year-to-year methodological changes in the 
construction of the index, they argue, likely have only a minor impact on changes in ordi-
nal rankings over time. To investigate this, we identified 82 countries that we could rank 
using TI data for 1999 and 2002, the midpoint years for periods 2 and 3 in our earlier 
analysis.
32 We then re-estimated all the models in Tables 2 and 3 using OLS estimation 
techniques and a country’s ordinal ranking as the dependent variable. The results were 
qualitatively similar to what is reported above.
33 
Second, to address the issue of possible simultaneity between the government size 
and the intervention variables and the level of corruption, each of the models presented in 
Table 2 was re-estimated under the assumption that Government Intervention (1), Govern-
ment Intervention (2) and Size of Government are properly modeled as endogenous right-
hand-side variables. The estimation was undertaken in two-stage least squares techniques, 
using literacy rate, countries with a substantial Protestant population, and a binary variable 
indicating whether a country is a “transition economy” as additional instrumental variables. 
These results were generally consistent with what is reported in Table 2. These results are 
likely unsurprising in light of the fact that in many countries government activity is pre-
determined each year based on legislation enacted in earlier years. Thus, government 
spending can be appropriately modeled as exogenous variables. A Hausman test was also 
performed for each model and indicated that OLS can be appropriately used for estimation. 
 
30  Interestingly, a change in urbanization can potentially either negate or reinforce the effects of government 
policy on corruption. Thankfully, the degree of urbanization in a country tends to change relatively slowly. 
31 Lambsdorff (2006a) provides further discussion on this topic. 
32 Period 1 data were excluded as the number of countries in our data set would have dropped considerably. 
33 These results and other omitted results are available upon request. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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As a final test of the robustness of our findings, we ran the same set of regressions 
using cross-sectional data for the latest time period in our sample (2001-2003). The results 
were qualitatively similar to those reported here. 
 
 
4  Conclusions 
 
Attention to corruption control across nations has been gaining prominence in recent years 
as governments and international bodies have stepped up corruption-fighting initiatives. 
Individual governments have strengthened laws to monitor and punish corrupt officials, 
and international bodies such as the United Nations and the IMF have advocated greater 
transparency in government contracts and recommended the elimination of the tax-
deductibility of bribes. However, policies to isolate the various avenues of corruption re-
main elusive, due mainly to a lack of understanding regarding the many factors affecting 
corruption. The problem is made more difficult by the fact that some institutional and cul-
tural influences on corruption are very subtle or hard to quantify. 
This paper contributes to the understanding of the causes of corruption by providing 
insights on the role of historical factors, geographic size, and the size and scope of gov-
ernment. Although the influence of some aspects of government on corruption has been 
studied for a smaller numbers of countries, (e.g. Jain, 2001; Lambsdorff, 2006b; and Serra, 
2006), our focus here on historical and geographic factors, as well as the effects of the size 
and scope of government, is unique. We considered a wide set of historical, geographical 
and government determinants of corruption, as well as some previously identified factors 
in finer detail. Besides providing a greater understanding of the causes of corrupt activities, 
our results have useful implications for public policy. For instance, historical and geo-
graphic influences may be largely viewed as exogenous for current policymakers, while 
government policies are endogenous. 
The two main questions addressed in this study pertained to the effects of the size 
and the scope of government on the incidence of corruption across countries, and the im-
portance of historical and geographic influences in affecting institutions that have a key 
bearing on corruption.  Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson 
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Overall, the answer to the first question is that both the size and scope of govern-
ment matters impact corruption. However, a large public sector in and of itself does not 
seem to contribute to the perceived level of corruption in a country. Indeed, our findings 
indicate precisely the opposite: a larger public sector presence is associated with less cor-
ruption, all other things equal, which perhaps reflects greater public vigilance against such 
behavior or stronger institutions that act to combat such activity. These cross-country find-
ings are contrary to those for the United States (Goel and Nelson, 1998). The magnitude of 
the effect of government size seems quite robust across different model specifications. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that certain forms of government intervention in the economy, 
and specifically the regulatory area, promote corruption by creating greater opportunities 
for bribe-taking and bribe-giving behavior. Further, the corruption-enhancing effect of 
government intervention has the potential to cancel out any reduction in corruption gener-
ated by larger government machinery (size). We find that a greater amount of administra-
tive subnational governments (i.e. greater decentralization) serving a given population may 
also deter corruption. The level of corruption in a country seems sensitive to the prevailing 
commercial code as some systems were found to promote corruption while others deterred 
such practices. 
Turning to question two and comparing the historical and geographic influences, 
only certain geographic factors lead to a reduction in corruption. Among the various as-
pects of geographic influence considered, our findings indicate that a country’s population 
distribution, rather than its physical expanse or natural resource endowments, is relatively 
more significant in terms of the impact on corruption. The inertia from past institutions and 
contractual norms seems to induce corruption to persist, as do new rent-seeking opportuni-
ties in transition nations. However, since these influences are largely exogenous, the find-
ings regarding the size and the scope of the government provide the most important in-
sights into how government policies might be changed to control corruption. Some of these 
government initiatives can be altered in the short run (e.g. government spending), while 
others take a longer time to be set in place (e.g. changing the number of administrative 
units in a nation). 
Comparing the magnitudes of the impacts of various determinants (Table 4), it 
seems that economic prosperity, governmental decentralization and urbanization poten-
tially hold promise for corruption reduction. However, the latter two are relatively hard to BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




change from year to year, suggesting the limited capacity of policies to bring down corrup-
tion quickly. 
  Some of these findings of this research are unique to the literature, while oth-
ers shed additional light on previous results with a larger sample of countries. The mixed 
findings with respect to some of the factors affecting corruption call into question the wis-
dom of issuing blanket corruption control recommendations across nations. For instance, it 
is not clear from the research that bigger governments would necessarily reduce corruption 
in every instance. Further, our focus on the geographic and historical influences highlights 
the difficulty that governments face as they formulate policy to deter corruption. On the 
other hand, the research has quite consistently demonstrated that as nations become more 
prosperous, the degree of corrupt activity goes down (Serra, 2006). Adherence to a consis-
tent legal system and greater decentralization of government machinery per capita both 
lead to lower corrupt activity. Finally, while the effect of greater government intervention 
is shown to be perverse on corruption, we need greater insight into country-specific chan-
nels of intervention to fully understand how various government policies might adversely 
affect corruption in some cases, and not in others. The answers to some of these questions 
should emerge over time as there is greater transparency in government actions. Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson 
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Table 1 Data sources and variable definitions
Variable Description  Mean 
(Std. Dev. )  Source 
Corrupt  Transparency International Corruption Index of Perceived Corruption. 
Index rescaled to -10 (least corrupt) to 0 (most corrupt). 
-4.77 
(2.40)  [1] 
Per Capita 
GDP  GDP per capita (in thousands of constant 1995 US$).  10.10 
(13.20)  [2] 
Democracy 
Sum of the Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties Indices used to 
measure the level of democracy in a country. Rescaled from -14 (least democra-
cy) to -2 (most democracy).  
-5.82  




Index of government intervention in the economy taking into account marginal 
income tax rates, the level and growth of government expenditures, state-owned 
enterprises, inflation rate trends, degree of regulation on foreign investment and 
capital flows, banking and finance regulation, and regulation of wages and 
prices. 
Index values range from -5 (most intervention) to -1 (least intervention).  
-2.82  




Index of government intervention in the economy taking into account inflation 
rate trends, degree of regulation on foreign investment and capital flows, bank-
ing and finance regulation, and regulation of wages and prices. 
Index values range from -5 (most intervention) to -1 (least intervention).  
-2.57 
(0.70)  [4] 
Size of Go-
vernment 
General government final consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP). 
15.96  
(5.57)  [2] 
Common Law 
System 
Binary variable equals 1 if the country’s company law or commercial code is 
based on English common law; 0 otherwise. 
0.28  
(0.45)  [5] 
Socialist Sys-
tem 
Binary variable equals 1 if the country has socialist/communist laws; 0 other-
wise. 
0.17 
(0.38)  [6] 
French System  Binary variable equals 1 if the country has French commercial code; 0 other-
wise. 
0.39 
(0.49)  [6] 
German Sys-
tem 
Binary variable equals 1 if the country has German commercial code; 0 other-
wise. 
0.07 
(0.26)  [6] 
Scandinavian 
System 
Binary variable equals 1 if the country has Scandinavian commercial code; 0 
otherwise. 
0.05 
(0.22)  [6] 
New Country  Binary variable equals 1 if the country became independent after 1950; 0 other-
wise. 
0.34  
(0.48)  [8] 
Old Country  Binary variable equals 1 if the country became independent before 1900; 0 oth-
erwise. 
0.36  
(0.48)  [8] 
Urban  Urban population (% of total).  60.56 
(21.15)  [2] 
Land Area  Land area (in thousands of square kilometers).  938.35 
(2,076.9)  [2] 
(Subnational 
Govt’s/pop)  
Number of first-order administrative divisions within country per 100,000 popu-
lation (in natural logs). 
-2.13 
(1.43)  [7] 
(Subnational 
Govt’s/area) 
Number of first-order administrative divisions within country per thousand 
square miles of land area (in natural logs). 
-2.58 
(1.69)  [8] 
Nat Res  Ores, metals, and fuels exports (as percent of GDP).  0.15 
(0.09)  [2] 
Internet  Internet users per 100,000 population.  101.4 
(140.2)  [2] 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, each variable is measured as the average of all available data for that variable for the following 
time periods: 1995-1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003.  
Descriptive statistics are based on largest available sample used to estimate the models reported in Table 3. 
Sources: 
1.  Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi 
2.  World Bank, World Development Indicators online database, 2004. 
3.  Freedom House, Freedom in the World country ratings, http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm 
4.  Heritage Foundation. 
5.  La Porta, et al. (1997) as reported in Treisman (2000). 
6.  La Porta, et al. (1999) 
7.  Treisman (2000) 
8.  US Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
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Table 2 Corruption, Size, and Scope of Government (Dependent variable: Corrupt) 
















































































(2.0)  ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- 
Government 
Intervention (2)  ----  -0.398
*** 
(2.9)  ----  -0.404
*** 
(2.9)  ---- ----  ---- 
Size of Govern-
















Govt’s/pop)  ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.163
** 
(2.1)  ----  ---- 
(Subnational 
Govt’s/area)  ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  0.002 
(0.04)  ---- 
Socialist System 












System  ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- -0.452 
(0.8) 








Observations  245 245 241 241 241  241 241 
Notes: Details about the variables are provided in Table 1. All models were estimated as random effects models and absolute 
values of t-statistics are in parentheses. The LM test here signifies the relative superiority of the random effects models over 
models ignoring country-specific effects. A constant term was included in all models but the corresponding results are not pre-
sented to conserve space.  
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Table 3 Corruption, History, and Geography (Dependent variable: Corrupt) 
 
























































New Country  0.463
* 
(1.7)  ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Old Country   0.549
*  
(1.9)  ---- ---- ---- ---- 












Land Area  ----  -0.002 
(0.4) 
-0.0002 
(0.03)  ---- ---- 
(Subnational 
Govt’s/area)  ---- ----   0.038 
(0.5)  ---- ---- 
Internet  ---- ---- ----  0.0002 
(0.4)  ---- 
Nat Res  ---- ---- ---- ----  -0.21 
(0.2) 
       






Observations  245 245 245 245 238 
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Table 4 Corruption, History, Geography, and Government 
(Dependent variable: Corrupt) 
 
   Model 5.1 
Change in Corruption Index resulting from 
change in right-hand column variable from 
minimum to maximum value in sample 
 
Per Capita GDP  -0.098
*** 
(10.2)  5.8 point improvement 
Democracy  -0.059
** 






















(2.6)   1.6 point improvement 
History 
 
New Country  0.598
** 
(2.4)  0.6 point deterioration  
Old Country   0.539
**  





(4.1)   2.1 point improvement 
 
    Reference: Sample standard deviation of 
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List of Countries in the Data Set 
 
Albania Cyprus  Iran  Namibia*  Sri Lanka* 
Algeria  Czech Rep.  Ireland*  New Zealand*  Sweden 
Armenia  Denmark  Israel*  Nicaragua Switzerland 
Australia*  Dominican 
Rep. 
Italy  Nigeria* Tanzania* 
Austria  Ecuador  Jamaica* Norway  Thailand* 
Azerbaijan Egypt  Japan Oman Trinidad and 
Tobago* 
Bahrain  El Salvador  Jordan Pakistan*  Tunisia 
Bangladesh* Estonia  Kenya*  Panama  Turkey 
Belarus  Ethiopia  Korea, Rep.  Papua New 
Guinea 
Uganda* 
Belgium  Finland Kuwait  Paraguay  Ukraine 
Bolivia France Latvia  Peru  U.A.E. 
Botswana* Georgia  Lebanon  Poland  U.K.* 
Brazil Germany  Lithuania Portugal  U.S.A.* 
Bulgaria  Ghana*  Luxembourg  Romania  Uruguay 
Cameroon  Greece  Madagascar Saudi  Arabia*  Vietnam 
Canada*  Guatemala  Malawi* Senegal  Zambia* 
Chile Haiti Malaysia* Sierra  Leone  Zimbabwe* 
China  Honduras  Mali Singapore*   
Columbia Hungary  Mexico  Slovak Rep.   
Congo, Rep.  Iceland  Moldova  Slovenia   
Costa Rica  India* Morocco  South  Africa*   
Cote d'Ivoire  Indonesia  Mozambique  Spain   
 
Notes: * denotes countries following the English common law; old countries are in bold. 
Details about the classifications are provided in Table 1.
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